The Ambiguous Consequences of Anti-dumping Laws

Michael Webb

Economic Inquiry, 1992, vol. 30, issue 3, 437-48

Abstract: The antidumping law is most often applied in oligopolistic industries, while most analyses focus on the monopoly model. The author analyzes a duopoly model where a foreign firm engages in price-based dumping. Under Cournot behavior, the antidumping law has ambiguous price and welfare effects. When the home firm is a Stackleberg leader, two disquieting effects emerge. First, the home firm can use the antidumping law to curtail competition even when the foreign firm does not initially engage in dumping. Second, the antidumping law can increase profits of both firms at the expense of domestic consumers. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1992
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:30:y:1992:i:3:p:437-48

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Preston McAfee

More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().