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Central Bank Secrecy, Interest Rates, and Monetary Control

Thomas Cosimano () and John van Huyck

Economic Inquiry, 1993, vol. 31, issue 3, 370-82

Abstract: The authors construct a dynamic rational expectations model of the federal funds and deposit market that provides a rationale for central bank secrecy about current monetary aggregate objectives. In this analysis, the Trading Desk values secrecy because it reduces the influence of monetary control policy on interest rates. The authors then examine actual U.S. experience with monetary control and determine that the reserve bias predicted by the model is present in the data from 1978 to 1985. Finally, they demonstrate that central bank secrecy may not lower the value of commercial banks. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1993
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