Moving Out of the House: An Analysis of Congressional Quits

D Eric Schansberg

Economic Inquiry, 1994, vol. 32, issue 3, 445-56

Abstract: Despite extensive study concerning involuntary departures by U.S. House members, little has been said about voluntary departures from the House--quit behavior. This paper has three primary purposes: (1) to establish a theoretical framework that models the full range of choices a representative faces in any given term, (2) to measure the impact of different variables that affect representatives' quit behavior, and (3) to explain why Republicans have been more likely to pursue higher office than their Democratic colleagues. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1994
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