Campaign War Chests as a Barrier to Entry in Congressional Races

Philip L Hersch and Gerald S McDougall

Economic Inquiry, 1994, vol. 32, issue 4, 630-41

Abstract: Intimidate and overpower have been used in campaign lore to describe the effects of an incumbent's war chest on potential challengers. The authors argue that a war chest can deter challengers by signaling a credible commitment to mount a formidable campaign if entry occurs. Results from a trichotomous logit model indicate that a large war chest reduces both the probability of a contested race and the quality of the challenger where entry does occur. The effect on the efficiency of political markets is unclear, however, depending on the reasons why incumbents are able to raise large war chests. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1994
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:32:y:1994:i:4:p:630-41

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Preston McAfee

More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().