The Biases of Federal Reserve Bank Presidents

Thomas Havrilesky and John Gildea

Economic Inquiry, 1995, vol. 33, issue 2, 274-84

Abstract: This paper develops statistical tests that show that, in Federal Open Market Committee voting, Federal Reserve bank presidents, as a group, prefer less expansionary monetary policy than Federal Reserve board members. Further tests show that a subset of Federal Reserve bank presidents vote in a manner that is consistent with the partisanship of the U.S. president during whose term they were appointed. Membership in this subset is highly correlated with a career as an economist. These results have implications for reforms that would alter the voting power of bank presidents on the Federal Open Market Committee. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1995
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