Governing a Groundwater Commons: A Strategic and Laboratory Analysis of Western Water Law

Roy Gardner, Michael R Moore and James Walker

Economic Inquiry, 1997, vol. 35, issue 2, 218-34

Abstract: The authors examine strategic behavior in groundwater depletion within the setting of state governance of groundwater resources in the American West. Solving a dynamic common-pool resource model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laboratory experiments. Three forms of legal rules--common-pool depletion with a 'rule-of-capture' to establish ownership (absolute ownership doctrine), entry restrictions (prior appropriation doctrine), and stock quotas (correlative rights doctrine)--are examined in terms of their impact on individual strategic behavior in laboratory experiments. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1997
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