Equilibrium Structure in an Economic Model of Conflict

Hugh M Neary

Economic Inquiry, 1997, vol. 35, issue 3, 480-94

Abstract: Four different types of equilibrium are possible within a two-player model of society where only armed self-enforcement of property rights is possible. The main underlying parameters are the total resource endowment and the initial distribution of this endowment between the players. The parameter space is partitioned into regions in which the respective types of equilibrium occur. The equilibrium types involve positive arms expenditure by, respectively, neither player, the richer player, and both players; the latter case involves a subtype in which the poorer player's entire endowment in expended on arms. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1997
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