Teaching Tools: A Pollution Rights Trading Game

Rachel A Nugent

Economic Inquiry, 1997, vol. 35, issue 3, 679-85

Abstract: This article describes a classroom game in which students simulate the U.S. EPA's market for emission allowances to understand the efficiency benefits of market-based incentives for pollution control. It can be used in either a principles or environmental economics course. Acting as managers of coal-fired power plants facing different clean-up costs, students compare the cost of pollution reduction to the cost of acquiring permits to emit pollution. The game can be conducted in one fifty-minute class period with discussion of the results carried over to the next class. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1997
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