Experimental Comparisons of Auctions under Single- and Multi-Unit Demand

Paul Alsemgeest, Charles Noussair and Mark Olson

Economic Inquiry, 1998, vol. 36, issue 1, 87-97

Abstract: An English clock auction and a sealed-bid auction with lowest accepted-bid pricing are studied in a controlled laboratory setting. Buyers bid for either a single unit or two units of the good. The sealed-bid auction generates more revenue than the English clock auction in both cases. The revenue from the English clock auction is lower in the two-unit demand environment than in the single-unit demand environment, due to strategic demand reduction on the part of bidders. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1998
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Working Paper: Experimental Comparisons of Auctions Under Single and Multi Unit Demand (1995)
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