Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games
Catherine Eckel () and
Philip Grossman ()
Economic Inquiry, 2001, vol. 39, issue 2, 171-88
We report the results of ultimatum game experiments designed to test for differences in the behavior of women and men. Women's proposals are on average more generous than men's, regardless of the sex of the partner, and women respondents are more likely to accept an offer of a given amount. A given offer is more likely to be accepted if it comes from a woman; we term this result chivalry. Women paired with women almost never fail to reach an agreement; we term this result solidarity. Age, earnings, and race also significantly affect proposals and the rates of rejection. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (233) Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:39:y:2001:i:2:p:171-88
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Preston McAfee
More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().