Bargaining Experiments with Deadlines and Random Delays

Frederic P Sterbenz and Owen R Phillips

Economic Inquiry, 2001, vol. 39, issue 4, 616-26

Abstract: In many bargaining environments there are random delays in the transmission of proposals. Two computerized bargaining experiments are designed to study behavior with this condition. A clock starts counting down from three minutes when the first offer is sent. In one experiment the clock is not stopped once the bargaining begins; in the other it is paused during the time an agent thinks about a counteroffer. All proposals are randomly delayed. Results are compared to a control design with no such delays. Delays create a first mover advantage, and agreements are more uniformly spread across a bargaining period. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 2001
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