EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strategic Groups and Rent Dissipation

Kyung Hwan Baik and Sanghack Lee

Economic Inquiry, 2001, vol. 39, issue 4, 672-84

Abstract: We consider a rent-seeking contest in which players can form strategic groups before expending their outlays. We examine the profitability of endogenous group formation and the effect of such group formation on rent dissipation. We show the following: When just one strategic group is formed in equilibrium, group formation is beneficial both to the group members and to the nonmembers, and rent dissipation is smaller than with usual individual rent seeking. However, when more than two strategic groups are formed in equilibrium, group formation is never profitable to any players, and rent dissipation is greater than with individual rent seeking. Copyright 2001 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36) Track citations by RSS feed

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:39:y:2001:i:4:p:672-84

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.oup.co.uk/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Preston McAfee

More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().

 
Page updated 2020-05-24
Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:39:y:2001:i:4:p:672-84