Production, Appropriation, and Income Transfer

Suk Jae Noh ()
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Suk Jae Noh: Dept. of Economics, Hallym University, 1 Okchon-dong, Chuncheon, Korea 200-702.

Economic Inquiry, 2002, vol. 40, issue 2, 279-287

Abstract: In a conflict between the prey and predator, the availability of income transfer option to the prey, given that defense is already an option, results in equilibrium where both defense and income transfer are utilized and the use of income transfer increases production efficiency by inducing either the prey or predator to divert resources from appropriation to production. The equilibrium amount of defense can be smaller because the prey has an interest in minimizing the amount of transfer that can be achieved in part by provoking a largest possible amount of offense from the predator if actual fight broke out. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2002
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