The Confederate Constitution, Tariffs, and the Laffer Relationship

Robert A. McGuire () and T. Norman Van Cott ()
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Robert A. McGuire: Department of Economics, University of Akron, Akron, OH 44325.
T. Norman Van Cott: Department of Economics, Ball State University, Muncie, IN 47306.

Economic Inquiry, 2002, vol. 40, issue 3, 428-438

Abstract: This article offers an example of a national constitution, that of the Confederate States of America, which effectively constrained its fiscal authorities to tax rates on the lower end of the Laffer relationship. The taxes were Confederate import tariffs. Drawing on primary sources, the paper documents the role that this de facto capping of tariff rates played in the history of the drafting of the Confederate Constitution. That the Laffer relationship found constitutional expression for an important tax suggests that the "tariff" might have played a more significant role in the North--South conflict than is currently acknowledged. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2002
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