An Economic Analysis of A Hybrid Liability Rule

Harold Winter

Economic Inquiry, 2002, vol. 40, issue 4, 704-710

Abstract: This article considers a legal setting with a tort liability rule that includes both a care-based component (such as negligence) and a non--care-based component (such as no liability). Children trespassers are sometimes protected by a doctrine known as attractive nuisance. Attractive nuisance acts as a hybrid liability rule in its application--it applies the negligence rule to accidents involving some types of children, and the no-liability rule to accidents involving other types of children. A standard economic model of torts is applied to a trespass setting, and the potential efficiency of a hybrid liability rule is examined. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2002
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