The Self-serving Bias and Beliefs about Rationality

Todd Kaplan and Bradley Ruffle

Economic Inquiry, 2004, vol. 42, issue 2, 237-246

Abstract: Most previous experiments attempting to establish the existence of the self-serving bias have confounded it with strategic behavior. We design an experiment that controls for strategic behavior (Haman effects) and isolates the bias itself. The self-serving bias that we measure concerns beliefs about the rationality of others. We find very limited support for the existence of the bias. To help understand why the bias seems to hold in some settings but not in others, we discuss a distinction between biases that are self-serving and those that are actually self-defeating. (JEL C92) Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

JEL-codes: C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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