Two-Player Asymmetric Contests with Ratio-Form Contest Success Functions

Kyung Baik

Economic Inquiry, 2004, vol. 42, issue 4, 679-689

Abstract: I examine players' equilibrium effort levels in two-player asymmetric contests with ratio-form contest success functions. I first characterize the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game. I show that the equilibrium effort ratio is equal to the valuation ratio, and that the prize dissipation ratios for the players are the same. I also show that the prize dissipation ratio for each player is less than or equal to the minimum of the players' probabilities of winning at the Nash equilibrium and thus never exceeds a half. Then I examine how the equilibrium effort ratio, the prize dissipation ratios, and the players' equilibrium effort levels respond when the players' valuations for the prize or their abilities change. (JEL D72, C72) Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ei/cbh089 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:42:y:2004:i:4:p:679-689

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Inquiry is currently edited by Preston McAfee

More articles in Economic Inquiry from Western Economic Association International Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().