Are Autocratic Rulers Also Inside Traders? Cross-Country Evidence

Edwin Eckard

Economic Inquiry, 2005, vol. 43, issue 1, 13-23

Abstract: Autocratic rulers can use economic regulation under their control to affect individual stock prices and then profit through insider trading. They are therefore less likely to have or enforce insider trading regulation. A cross-sectional analysis of 101 countries with stock markets supports the hypothesis. The probability of observing an enforced insider trading law is much lower in autocracies than in other countries. (JEL D73, G28, L51) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

JEL-codes: D73 G28 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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