Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions: An Empirical Investigation

Dakshina De Silva

Economic Inquiry, 2005, vol. 43, issue 1, 55-66

Abstract: This article examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road construction procurement auctions. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When bidders with potential synergies participate, the results indicate that their probability of bidding and winning increases and they bid more aggressively. Finally, the study shows that a firm that is capacity unconstrained will bid more aggressively than one that is capacity constrained. (JEL D44) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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