Combining Monetary and Social Sanctions to Promote Cooperation

Charles Noussair and Steven Tucker

Economic Inquiry, 2005, vol. 43, issue 3, 649-660

Abstract: We employ an experimental approach to consider the impact of a combination of formal and informal sanctions on contribution levels for a specific type of public good. We find that when both sanctions are available, contributions and overall welfare are higher than when only one of the two sanctioning systems is available. The availability of an array of sanctions of varying severity appears to enhance welfare. (JEL C92) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

JEL-codes: C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (140)

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