Silent Auctions in the Field and in the Laboratory

R. Isaac and Kurt Schnier ()

Economic Inquiry, 2005, vol. 43, issue 4, 715-733

Abstract: We analyze data from hundreds of auctions from three field silent auction sessions. We focus on the descriptive statistics and on a parametric model of jump bidding. We then report data from six laboratory sessions of silent auctions. As a controlled environment, this allows us to evaluate the auctions in ways not available within the field. The laboratory experiments capture essential features of the field sessions and thus comprise a credible laboratory testbed for further examination of institutional perturbations in the silent auction. (JEL D44, H41) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

JEL-codes: D44 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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