Lessons from a Failed Airline Auction

J. Patrick Meister and Kyle J. Anderson

Economic Inquiry, 2006, vol. 44, issue 2, 311-317

Abstract: In 1995, USAir placed itself for sale in an English auction. Interestingly, no bids were placed. This does not imply that the available firm is not a valuable acquisition. If losing reduces profits, firms wish to avoid a profit-reducing bidding war. However, in a sealed-bid auction (with no credible nonparticipation commitments), firms place profit-reducing bids in equilibrium. Also, a novelty of our analysis is the specification of the loser's profit rising with the price that the winner pays. This highlights an important explanation of bidding wars because a firm may bid simply to make the eventual winner pay a higher price. (JEL L1, L9) Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

JEL-codes: L1 L9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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