Eliciting and Aggregating Information By Sortition in Collective Choice

Rene Saran and Norovsambuu Tumennasan ()

The Economic Journal, 2019, vol. 129, issue 620, 1924-1952

Abstract: We study the effectiveness of sortition to elicit and aggregate information that is dispersed among groups of individuals facing a collective choice problem. Sortition is the process of selecting decision-makers by a kleroterion (lottery machine). In environments with private consumption, we identify a large class of kleroteria that is as effective as direct democracy in (fully) implementing social choice functions. Examples include an opinion poll, where a random sample of two (or more) individuals are selected from each group, and ‘oligarchy with random audit’, where the group leaders are ‘audited’ by a randomly selected individual.

Date: 2019
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