Iterative Versus Standard Deferred Acceptance: Experimental Evidence

Inacio Bo and Rustamdjan Hakimov

The Economic Journal, 2020, vol. 130, issue 626, 356-392

Abstract: We test experimentally the Gale–Shapley Deferred Acceptance mechanism versus two versions of the Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism, in which students make applications one at a time. A significantly higher proportion of stable outcomes is reached under Iterative Deferred Acceptance Mechanism than under Deferred Acceptance. The difference can be explained by a higher proportion of subjects following an equilibrium truthful strategy under iterative mechanisms than the dominant strategy of truthful reporting under Deferred Acceptance. We associate the benefits of iterative mechanisms with the feedback on the outcome of the previous application that they provide to students between steps.

Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Iterative versus standard deferred acceptance: Experimental evidence (2016)
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