EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy

Sharun Mukand and Dani Rodrik

The Economic Journal, 2020, vol. 130, issue 627, 765-792

Abstract: This paper develops a taxonomy of political regimes that distinguishes between three sets of rights—property rights, political rights and civil rights. The truly distinctive nature of liberal democracy is the protection of civil rights (equal treatment by the state for all groups) in addition to the other two. The paper shows how democratic transitions that are the product of a settlement between the elite (who care mostly about property rights) and the majority (who care about political rights), generically fail to produce liberal democracy. Instead, the emergence of liberal democracy requires low levels of inequality and weak identity cleavages.

Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/ej/ueaa004 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy (2015) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:econjl:v:130:y:2020:i:627:p:765-792.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

The Economic Journal is currently edited by Francesco Lippi

More articles in The Economic Journal from Royal Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press () and ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:oup:econjl:v:130:y:2020:i:627:p:765-792.