Kin Networks and Institutional Development
Jonathan F Schulz
The Economic Journal, 2022, vol. 132, issue 647, 2578-2613
Abstract:
This study provides evidence that strong kin networks are detrimental for democratic participatory institutions and that the medieval Catholic Church's marriage regulations dissolved Europe's clan-based kin networks, which contributed to the emergence of participatory institutions. I show that weak ancestral kin networks are positively associated with ethnicities’ democratic traditions in the past and countries’ democracy scores today. At the same time, medieval Church exposure predicts weak kin networks across countries, European regions and ethnicities. In a historical difference-in-difference analysis, I provide evidence that exposure to the Church contributed to the formation of medieval communes—self-governed cities with participatory institutions. Moreover, within Christian Europe, stricter regional and temporal marriage prohibitions are associated with commune formation. Lastly, I shed light on one mechanism, civicness, and show that weak kin networks are associated with more political participation.
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:econjl:v:132:y:2022:i:647:p:2578-2613.
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