Shifting Punishment onto Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating
Michal Bauer,
Jana Cahlikova,
Julie Chytilová,
Gérard Roland and
Tomas Zelinsky
The Economic Journal, 2023, vol. 133, issue 652, 1626-1640
Abstract:
Do members of a majority group systematically shift punishment onto innocent members of an ethnic minority? We introduce an experimental paradigm, punishing the scapegoat game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander. When no harm is done, we find no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority (Roma people in Slovakia). In contrast, when a member of one's own group is harmed, the punishment ‘passed’ onto innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group.
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating (2021) 
Working Paper: Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating (2021) 
Working Paper: Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating (2021) 
Working Paper: Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating (2021) 
Working Paper: Shifting Punishment on Minorities: Experimental Evidence of Scapegoating (2021) 
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