Political Activists as Free Riders: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment

Anselm Hager, Lukas Hensel, Johannes Hermle and Christopher Roth

The Economic Journal, 2023, vol. 133, issue 653, 2068-2084

Abstract: How does a citizen’s decision to participate in political activism depend on the participation of others? We conduct a nationwide natural field experiment in collaboration with a major European party during a recent national election. In a party survey, we randomly provide canvassers with true information about the canvassing intentions of their peers. When learning that more peers participate in canvassing than previously believed, canvassers significantly reduce both their canvassing intentions and behaviour. An additional survey among party supporters underscores the importance of free-riding motives and reveals that there is strong heterogeneity in motives underlying supporters’ behavioural responses.

Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Political Activists as Free-Riders: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment (2022)
Working Paper: Political Activists as Free-Riders: Evidence From a Natural Field Experiment (2022)
Working Paper: Political Activists as Free-Riders: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment (2020)
Working Paper: Political Activists as Free-Riders: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment (2019)
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