Taste-Based Gender Favouritism in High-Stake Decisions: Evidence from The Price is Right

Pavel Atanasov, Jason D Dana and Bouke Klein

The Economic Journal, 2024, vol. 134, issue 658, 856-883

Abstract: Gender discrimination is present across various fields, but identifying the underlying mechanism is challenging. We demonstrate own-gender favouritism in a field setting that allows for clean identification of tastes versus beliefs: the One Bid game on the TV show The Price Is Right. Players must guess an item’s value without exceeding it, leaving the last bidder with a dominant ‘cutoff’ strategy of overbidding another player by 1. We show that last bidders are significantly more likely to cut off opposite-gender opponents. This behaviour is explained by own-gender favouritism rather than beliefs that cutting off opposite-gender opponents is more profitable.

Date: 2024
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