Making Policies Matter: Voter Responses to Campaign Promises
Cesi Cruz,
Philip Keefer,
Julien Labonne and
Francesco Trebbi
The Economic Journal, 2024, vol. 134, issue 661, 1875-1913
Abstract:
Can voters in clientelist countries be swayed by programmatic promises? Results from a structural model and a field experiment disseminating candidate policy platforms in Philippine mayoral elections indicate that they can. Voters who received information about candidate policy promises were more likely to vote for candidates who were closer to their own preferences. Voters who were informed about incumbent candidates’ past commitments were more likely to vote for incumbents who fulfilled them. The structural model uncovers mechanisms. Information about campaign promises increases policies’ salience relative to other voter concerns; it also affects voter beliefs about candidate quality and candidates’ platforms.
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Making Policies Matter: Voter Responses to Campaign Promises (2018) 
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