Iterated Admissibility does not Refine Extensive-form Rationalizability

Emiliano Catonini

The Economic Journal, 2024, vol. 134, issue 663, 3017-3026

Abstract: I show that, in an extensive-form game, the outcomes that are consistent with iterated admissibility (i.e., with the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies) need not be consistent with extensive-form rationalizability.

Date: 2024
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