The Greek debt restructuring: an autopsy

Greek bond buyback boondoggle

Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch and Mitu Gulati

Economic Policy, 2013, vol. 28, issue 75, 513-563

Abstract: The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 stands out in the history of sovereign defaults. It achieved very large debt relief – over 50% of 2012 GDP – with minimal financial disruption, using a combination of new legal techniques, exceptionally large cash incentives, and official sector pressure on key creditors. But it did so at a cost. The timing and design of the restructuring left money on the table from the perspective of Greece, created a large risk for European taxpayers, and set precedents – particularly in its very generous treatment of holdout creditors – that are likely to make future debt restructurings in Europe more difficult.— Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch and Mitu Gulati

Date: 2013
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Working Paper: The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy (2013)
Working Paper: The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy (2013)
Working Paper: The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy (2013)
Working Paper: The Greek debt restructuring: An autopsy (2013)
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