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The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy

Mitu Gulati, Christoph Trebesch () and Jeromin Zettelmeyer ()

No 9577, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 stands out in the history of sovereign defaults. It achieved very large debt relief – over 50 per cent of 2012 GDP – with minimal financial disruption, using a combination of new legal techniques, exceptionally large cash incentives, and official sector pressure on key creditors. But it did so at a cost. The timing and design of the restructuring left money on the table from the perspective of Greece, created a large risk for European taxpayers, and set precedents – particularly in its very generous treatment of holdout creditors – that are likely to make future debt restructurings in Europe more difficult.

Keywords: debt restructuring; Eurozone crisis; financial crises; Greece; sovereign debt; sovereign default (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-opm
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