Building bridges to peace: a quantitative evaluation of power-sharing agreements

Hannes Mueller and Christopher Rauh

Economic Policy, 2024, vol. 39, issue 118, 411-467

Abstract: Power-sharing agreements are used as a tool to reduce political violence in regions of conflict, but agreements are often followed by violence. This is due to the fact that such agreements are introduced during periods of political violence when a country is inside the conflict trap, which makes it difficult to distinguish the effect of the agreement from the political context that generates persistent political violence. In this study, we match pre-agreement conflict risk to estimate the effects of power-sharing agreements on violence using a difference-in-difference method. The results show that violence falls immediately after an agreement, with the effects strengthening over time. Comprehensive agreements tend to be particularly successful. We show that broader institutional changes that have their nucleus in the agreements are crucial elements explaining these large changes.

Keywords: F51; D74; O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/epolic/eiae010 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Building Bridges to Peace: A Quantitative Evaluation of Power-Sharing Agreements (2022)
Working Paper: Building Bridges to Peace: A Quantitative Evaluation of Power-Sharing Agreements (2022)
Working Paper: Building Bridges to Peace: A Quantitative Evaluation of Power-Sharing Agreements (2022)
Working Paper: Building Bridges to Peace: A Quantitative Evaluation of Power-Sharing Agreements (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:ecpoli:v:39:y:2024:i:118:p:411-467.

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Policy is currently edited by Ghazala Azmat, Roberto Galbiati, Isabelle Mejean and Moritz Schularick

More articles in Economic Policy from CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po Contact information at EDIRC., CES Contact information at EDIRC., MSH Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().