 Building Bridges to Peace: A Quantitative Evaluation of Power-Sharing AgreementsHannes Mueller and Christopher Rauh Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge Abstract: Power-sharing agreements are used as a tool to reduce political violence in regions of conflict, but agreements are often followed by violence. This is due to the fact that such agreements are introduced during periods of political violence when a country is inside the conflict trap, which makes it difficult to distinguish the effect of the agreement from the political context that generates persistent political violence. In this study we match on pre-agreement risk to estimate the effects of power sharing agreements on violence using a difference-in-difference method. The results show that violence falls immediately after an agreement, with the effects strengthening over time. Subsequent changes in institutional features of democracy, such as the absence of exclusion, are also associated with reductions in political violence. Date: 2022-10-27 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:2261 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge |
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