Rent Seeking in North-South Agricultural Trade

Gerald Nelson

European Review of Agricultural Economics, 1989, vol. 16, issue 1, 53-64

Abstract: Until the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, less developed countries had not lobbied systematically for developed country agricultural trade liberalization either individually or as a group, despite the strong probability that such liberalization would increase less developed countries income. The paper reviews previous hypotheses for this behavior and identifies another explanation. Developed country agricultural distortions sometimes result in income transfers to a group of less developed country agricultural producers who lobby both at home and abroad for the continuation of the developed country distortions. Examples from cassava and sugar trade are discussed. Copyright 1989 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1989
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