Primary and Secondary Producers: Economic Implications of Contracts in the Food Marketing Chain

Hans Andersson

European Review of Agricultural Economics, 1995, vol. 22, issue 3, 310-20

Abstract: In this paper a principal-agent model is used to examine the optimal contracting problem of a large processor situated in a geographically limited area. The model is an extension of Holthausen's result (1979). The model design considers various degrees of price-risk exposure for raw material and processed products, risk preferences and technology parameters. The optimal contract is endogenously determined and shown to be a function of technology parameters, factor prices, risk measures in the spot markets and risk preferences of the parties involved. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:erevae:v:22:y:1995:i:3:p:310-20

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

European Review of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Timothy Richards, Salvatore Di Falco, Céline Nauges and Vincenzina Caputo

More articles in European Review of Agricultural Economics from Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().