Multilateral Agricultural Trade Negotiations: A Non-cooperative and Cooperative Game Approach

P Lynn Kennedy, Harald von Witzke and Terry Roe

European Review of Agricultural Economics, 1996, vol. 23, issue 4, 381-99

Abstract: Agricultural trade negotiations are modelled using a non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretic framework. The model distinguishes between the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and a politically passive rest-of-the-world. Particular emphasis is placed on the effect of the exchange rate on the equilibrium outcome of the games. Through the use of intra-country compensation, the analysis shows that the US is able to convince the EU to adopt modest reform. With inter-country compensation the EU chooses a decreased level of protection, but does not choose completely free trade. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1996
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European Review of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Timothy Richards, Salvatore Di Falco, Céline Nauges and Vincenzina Caputo

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