 Does Compensation for Disruptions Stimulate Reforms? The Case of Agrarian Reform in Central and Eastern EuropeEuropean Review of Agricultural Economics, 1997, vol. 24, issue 2, 249-66 Abstract: Most Central and Eastern European governments have decided to restore land to former owners, but there has been opposition to land reform from managers and workers of collective farms. This opposition has slowed down the reform because the local reform-implementing institutions (the 'Reform Councils') are heavily influenced by collective-farm interests. Governments have contemplated offering compensation to encourage acceptance of the reforms. This paper argues that compensation will not stimulate agrarian reform in CEECs unless it is explicitly linked to the implementation of the reforms. The paper discusses alternative options for changing the incentive structure of the Reform Councils, but concludes that results depend on the initial institutional design of the Reform Councils and the selection of their members. Copyright 1997 by Oxford University Press. Date: 1997 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:erevae:v:24:y:1997:i:2:p:249-66 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article European Review of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Timothy Richards, Salvatore Di Falco, Céline Nauges and Vincenzina Caputo More articles in European Review of Agricultural Economics from Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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