The joint effect of government crop insurance and loan programmes on the demand for futures hedging

Keith Coble

European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2004, vol. 31, issue 3, 309-330

Abstract: This research re-evaluates producer risk management decisions regarding the choice of forward pricing strategies when governmentally subsidised crop insurance designs and price supports are available. An analytical model is developed to illustrate the substitution of loan programmes for hedging. In particular, we find that this relationship is conditioned on yield levels. Also, a numerical analysis is conducted that incorporates futures prices, basis and yield variability. Three alternative crop insurance designs are evaluated. Optimal futures hedge ratios are derived for expected utility-maximising soybean farmers. Our results suggest that government programme levels profoundly alter the farmer's optimal strategy. We also find that apparently speculative behaviour is risk-minimising when high loan rates and revenue insurance are combined. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2004
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European Review of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Timothy Richards, Salvatore Di Falco, Céline Nauges and Vincenzina Caputo

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