 Relationships among government payments, crop insurance payments and crop revenueRobert J. Hauser European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2004, vol. 31, issue 3, 353-368 Abstract: Risk abatement characteristics of a public sector programme (counter-cyclical payments) and a quasi-private market instrument (crop insurance) are assessed at the farm level. Crop market revenues and insurance payments have strong linkages to pre-planting price and yield conditions, whereas the conditions underlying government programme payments are less affected by prices, crop shares or actual yields. Contrary to a belief often expressed by producers, the counter-cyclical programme does not duplicate or substitute strongly for crop insurance programmes. It is also found that measurement of crop-revenue risk abatement from using either public or quasi-private instruments can be particularly sensitive to the price environment and components of market revenue. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press. Date: 2004 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:erevae:v:31:y:2004:i:3:p:353-368 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article European Review of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Timothy Richards, Salvatore Di Falco, Céline Nauges and Vincenzina Caputo More articles in European Review of Agricultural Economics from Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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