 The status quo bias and reform of the Common Agricultural Policy: impact of voting rules, the European Commission and external changesJan Pokrivcak, Christophe Crombez and Johan Swinnen European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2006, vol. 33, issue 4, 562-590 Abstract: We develop a formal model of EU decision-making on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The model is used to evaluate under what conditions CAP reform occurs and what the influence of the European Commission (Commission) is on CAP reform. We find that the voting and amendment rules in the Council of the European Union, the number of policy instruments and external changes have important impacts on the occurrence and extent of CAP reform and on the influence of the Commission. Stricter voting rules increase the status quo bias and reduce Commission influence, whereas stricter amendment rules increase both the status quo bias and Commission influence. More significant external change results in more reform and more Commission influence. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press. Date: 2006 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:erevae:v:33:y:2006:i:4:p:562-590 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article European Review of Agricultural Economics is currently edited by Timothy Richards, Salvatore Di Falco, Céline Nauges and Vincenzina Caputo More articles in European Review of Agricultural Economics from Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.