Governance and managerial effort in consumer-owned enterprises

Murray Fulton and Dionne Pohler

European Review of Agricultural Economics, 2015, vol. 42, issue 5, 713-737

Abstract: This article develops a political economy model of the board–manager relationship in consumer-owned enterprises (COEs), illustrating how the governance structure plays a key role in determining managerial power. The key conclusion of the article is that managerial remuneration and the resources devoted to governance are strategic choices for the COE and that their determination involves a trade-off. This trade-off depends on factors external to the COE, such as the COE's time horizon (as captured in the discount rate) and the manager's opportunity cost outside the COE (e.g. the remuneration paid in investor-owned firms). The trade-off also is influenced by the degree of complementarity between remuneration and governance resources, and by the sensitivity of managerial utility to financial remuneration and to governance.

Date: 2015
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