 If Nelson and Winter are only half right about tacit knowledge, which half? A Searlean critique of 'codification'Industrial and Corporate Change, 2003, vol. 12, issue 2, 149-183 Abstract: The paper explores the inherent tensions in the relationships between different theories of knowledge. The paper shows how Polanyi's rather nebulous concept of tacit knowledge can be given a rigorous foundation in recent biological treatments that link neurological causal processes, subjective mental states and speech acts. Drawing on the work of John Searle, the paper shows how information-processing approaches relate to these 'cause and effect' relationships in order to critique the binary distinction between tacit and codified knowledge. The utility of the framework and the problems with this binary distinction are illustrated by showing the confusions behind recent theories that propose that information technologies allow the codification of tacit knowledge. Errors inherent in the idea of codification are traced back to Newell and Simon's abstract 'programme level' of explanation. Implications for science policy, technical learning, management and innovation are discussed. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press. Date: 2003 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:indcch:v:12:y:2003:i:2:p:149-183 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Industrial and Corporate Change is currently edited by Josef Chytry More articles in Industrial and Corporate Change from Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. |
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