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Determinants of governance structure in alliances: the role of strategic, task and partner uncertainties

Tiziana Casciaro

Industrial and Corporate Change, 2003, vol. 12, issue 6, 1223-1251

Abstract: Research in transaction cost economics and structural sociology has emphasized the role of opportunism and trust in the choice between equity and non-equity governance forms in alliances. This paper suggests that the uncertainty surrounding partner cooperation is not straightforwardly predictive of governance structure in alliances. Instead, task uncertainty and strategic uncertainty associated with the activities performed within alliances induce coordination and adaptation requirements that are important determinants of alliance governance, independently of partner uncertainty. Support for this view is provided based on a 12-year panel of alliances formed in the US telecommunications, entertainment and computer industries. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2003
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