Explicating political hazards and safeguards: a transaction cost politics approach

Witold Henisz () and Bennet A. Zelner

Industrial and Corporate Change, 2004, vol. 13, issue 6, 901-915

Abstract: We apply the logic of comparative institutional analysis to the question of the governance of the relationship between private investors and the government. We consider two strategies that investors may follow: lobbying for the creation of a specialized political governance structure and relying on more general political mechanisms to influence policy in a given industry on an ongoing basis. We identify political hazards as a crucial determinant of the choice of political governance and the transactional attributes that give rise to such hazards. Finally, we highlight shift parameters in a nation's institutional environment that influence the choice between specialized and generalized political governance mechanisms. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2004
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