Post-sale service and the limits of reputation

Scott Masten and Renáta Kosová

Industrial and Corporate Change, 2013, vol. 22, issue 6, 1663-1698

Abstract: In the standard durable goods-quality model, the prospect of repeat sales often supports the provision of high-quality durable goods. When durable goods require costly post-sale service, however, a reputational equilibrium may not exist at any price, even with a flow of profitable new sales indefinitely into the future. This article characterizes the size of the premium needed to make provision of post-sale service self enforcing and then uses historical records to assess the self-enforcing post-sale service premia for United Shoe Machinery, IBM, and Xerox. Copyright 2013 The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Associazione ICC. All rights reserved., Oxford University Press.

Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/icc/dtt004 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:indcch:v:22:y:2013:i:6:p:1663-1698

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Industrial and Corporate Change is currently edited by Josef Chytry

More articles in Industrial and Corporate Change from Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().