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The patent paradox in crowdfunding: an empirical analysis of Kickstarter data

Azzurra Meoli, Federico Munari and James Bort

Industrial and Corporate Change, 2019, vol. 28, issue 5, 1321-1341

Abstract: Building on signaling theory, this paper analyzes whether projects signaling patented technologies have a higher probability of funding success on a reward-based crowdfunding platform as compared with a control group of similar projects. Our analysis of a set of Kickstarter projects suggests the existence of an apparent paradox concerning the role of patents in this funding context. Despite solid evidence in entrepreneurial finance literature on the positive role of patents for accessing financing from professional investors such as venture capitals and business angels, our results from the reward-based crowdfunding context point out a negative signaling role of patents. We provide explanations to reconcile such evidence with previous relevant literature and highlight promising avenues for future research in this area.

JEL-codes: G29 O31 O34 O35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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