When soft budget constraints promote innovation: Kornai meets Schumpeter in Japan

Max Jerneck

Industrial and Corporate Change, 2020, vol. 29, issue 6, 1415-1430

Abstract: The article examines János Kornai’s influential argument that “soft budget constraints” impede innovation, and finds that under certain conditions, they may promote it instead. Kornai’s concept is derived from his analysis of socialism. In capitalism, soft budget constraints can promote innovation if competition is enforced and finance is well regulated. This argument is developed using the same Schumpeterian foundation as Kornai, illustrated empirically with the case of innovation in post-war Japan. Implications are relevant for innovation and industrial policy in general.

JEL-codes: L00 N15 O30 O31 O38 P10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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