Price Cap Policies in the Transition from Monopoly to Competitive Markets

Sanford Berg and R Dean Foreman

Industrial and Corporate Change, 1995, vol. 4, issue 4, 671-81

Abstract: Price cap regulation is replacing traditional rate of return regulation in a number of jurisdictions. This development can be viewed as a regulatory mechanism facilitating the transition from monopoly to competitive markets. However, multiple goals cannot be achieved via a single instrument. Pure price caps have been modified to better meet the mix of regulatory objectives. These modifications further constrain incumbent telcos. Copyright 1995 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1995
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